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Religious Arbitration and the Establishment Clause
Religious arbitration agreements-which compel parties to
resolve their private legal disputes before a religious tribunal or
according to religious doctrine-are often enforced by courts. This
Article argues that their enforcement may violate the Establishment
Clause. In particular, the "nondelegation doctrine "-first articulated
in Larkin v. Grendel's Den-limits the government's ability to
delegate its power to religious institutions. The concern is not that the
government would entangle itself in religious affairs, but the opposite:
that religious institutions would acquire control over a core
governmental function. Under this doctrine, the enforcement of
religious arbitration agreements may constitute a delegation to
religious institutions of a core governmental function, namely, the
adjudication and enforcement of the private law. Such a delegation of
governmental authority may be problematic either because it favors
some religious groups over others, or because it allows religious
institutions to acquire unchecked authority over their members and
participants. Additionally, this Article argues that enforcement of
religious arbitration agreements is not required by other
Establishment Clause doctrines uch as the "religious question"
doctrine or the principle of neutrality toward religion.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Religious arbitration agreements, whereby parties agree to resolve
legal disputes through a religious tribunal or according to religious doctrine,
are becoming an increasingly visible feature of the American legal landscape.'
Such agreements may be found in a variety of contracts-including
employment contracts, service agreements, and prenuptial agreements-
especially when contracts are executed with, or under the purview of, a
religious institution or service provider. Courts have typically enforced
religious arbitration agreements, in accordance with the sweeping presumption
in favor of enforcing arbitration agreements generally.
2
This Article argues that despite the pro-enforcement status quo, courts
and commentators should take seriously the possibility that the judicial
enforcement of religious arbitration agreements may violate the Establishment
Clause.3 While scholars have raised a number of arguments both in favor of
and against the judicial enforcement of religious arbitration clauses,' little
sustained attention has been paid to whether such enforcement is
i For recent discussions of religious arbitration, see generally Michael A. Helfand,
Arbitration's Counter-Narrative: The Religious Arbitration Paradigm, 124 YALE L.J.
2994 (2016) and Michael Corkery & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, In Religious Arbitration,
When Scripture Is the Rule ofLaw, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2015, at Al.
2 For seminal cases involving religious arbitration agreements, see generally Encore
Prods., Inc. v. Promise Keepers, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (D. Colo. 1999) (enforcing arbitration
clause in commercial contract according to which the arbitration would be conducted
according to rules promulgated by the Institute for Christian Conciliation) and Greenberg
v. Greenberg, 238 A.D.2d 420 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (vacating spousal support award
issued by Family Court on the grounds that the wife had signed an agreement requiring
that all disputes between husband and wife be submitted to a "Bais Din" or Rabbinical
Court).
3U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4 For arguments in favor of enforcement, see, e.g., Farrah Ahmed & Senwung Luk,
How Religious Arbitration Could Enhance Personal Autonomy, 1 OXFORD J.L. AND
RELIGION 424 (2012) (arguing thatjudicial enforcement of religious arbitration agreements
may enhance the individual autonomy of religious believers) and Eugene Volokh,
Religious Law (Especially Islamic Law) in American Courts, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 431 (2013)
(arguing that enforcement of religious arbitration agreements may be protected by state
and federal religious freedom laws). For a critical assessment of religious arbitration
agreements, see Shiva Falsafi, Religion, Women, and the Holy Grail of Legal Pluralism,
35 CARDozo L. REv. 1881, 1882 (2014) (suggesting that "unfettered religious autonomy
runs the risk of excluding parties to religious contracts from the civil courts, thereby
potentially compromising important individual liberties").
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constitutional.' When courts have considered the question, they have typically
assumed that the constitution would require enforcing religious arbitration
agreements, either to avoid religious entanglement or to preserve government
neutrality toward religion.6 But these are not the only relevant Establishment
Clause issues. Another, potentially more worrisome, concern is that judicial
enforcement of religious arbitration agreements would allow religious
institutions to acquire effective control over the government's power to
enforce the civil law. As such, enforcement of religious arbitration agreements
may run afoul of the Establishment Clause's "nondelegation doctrine,"
according to which the government may not delegate its power to religious
institutions where that delegation results in a fusion of governmental and
religious functions. The origin of the nondelegation doctrine is Larkin v.
Grendel's Den, in which the Supreme Court struck down a state law granting
churches the power to veto liquor licenses on the grounds that the law was an
impermissible delegation of the government's authority to religious
' For the most direct discussion of the enforceability of religious arbitration
agreements under the Establishment Clause, see Michael A. Helfand, Religious Arbitration
and the New Multiculturalism: Negotiating Conflicting Legal Orders, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1231, 1244-45 n.61 (2011) and accompanying text (noting that courts have consistently
rejected Establishment Clause arguments against enforceability of religious arbitration
agreements) and at 1272-79 (discussing the application of Establishment Clause doctrine,
including Kiryas Joel, to religious arbitration agreements). See also Jodi M. Solovy, Civil
Enforcement of Jewish Marriage and Divorce: Constitutional Accommodation of a
Religious Mandate, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 493 (1996) (arguing that enforcement of religious
arbitration agreements passes the Lemon test and so does not violate the Establishment
Clause); Charles P. Trumbull, Islamic Arbitration: A New Path for Interpreting Islamic
Legal Contracts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 609, 642 (2006) (arguing that courts may enforce
religious arbitration agreements consistently with the Establishment Clause because they
can base their decisions on "neutral principles of law" and do not have to interpret or apply
religious doctrine directly); Nicholas Walter, Religious Arbitration in the United States
and Canada, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 501, 521-27 (2012) (discussing enforcement of
religious arbitration awards over First Amendment objections).
6 See Encore Prods., Inc., 53 F. Supp. 2d at 1112-13 (arguing that enforcement of the
religious arbitration agreement allows the court to "apply neutral principles of law to
determine disputed questions that do not implicate religious doctrine") and Meshel v. Ohev
Sholom Talmud Torah, 869 A.2d 343, 354 (D.C. 2005) (holding that compelling
arbitration before a rabbinical court did not violate the First Amendment because "the
resolution of appellants' action to compel arbitration will not require the civil court to
determine, or even address, any aspect of the parties' underlying [religious] dispute").
' See Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 126 (1982) (striking down on
Establishment Clause grounds a state statute that delegated churches the power to reject
certain liquor license applications).
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institutions.' Similarly, by enforcing a religious arbitration agreement, the
court may be impermissibly delegating its authority to adjudicate and enforce
the private law to religious institutions or religious leaders. The enforcement
of secular arbitration agreements does not raise comparable issues, because
the delegation of governmental authority, if any, is not being made to a
religious institution.9
Delegating the government's authority over the private law to
religious authorities may be problematic for two reasons. First, such a
delegation may tend to favor some religious groups over others, in violation
of the basic principle of government neutrality with respect to religion.'o Even
a general policy of enforcing religious arbitration agreements may result in
extra benefits for those religious groups that are more legally sophisticated.
Second, the enforcement of religious arbitration agreements may have the
effect of coercing participation in religious institutions, or imposing steep
costs on ending one's membership or affiliation. In this respect, enforcement
of religious arbitration agreements may conflict with the state's role in
ensuring that religious institutions are "voluntary associations." " These
arguments against enforcement of religious arbitration agreements are
consistent with the potential religious value of alternative dispute resolution.
Even if courts decline to enforce religious arbitration agreements, other
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms would remain available. For
example, religious persons may continue to employ nonbinding religious
arbitration or mediation to reach mutually acceptable settlements of legal
disputes. And parties who are motivated by their religious beliefs to avoid
utilizing civil courts may continue to employ secular arbitration agreements in
their contractual relationships.
This Article is divided into four parts. Part I provides a basic overview
of religious arbitration agreements and their enforceability under existing
8 Id Note that the Establishment Clause "nondelegation doctrine" described in this
Article is not to be confused with the seldom-enforced Article I "nondelegation doctrine"
according to which Congress may not pass a law that effectively delegates law-making
authority to executive agencies.
9 Id at 122 ("We need not decide whether, or upon what conditions, such power may
ever be delegated to nongovernmental entities.").
10 See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) ("The
wholesome 'neutrality' of which this Court's cases speak thus stems from a recognition of
the teachings of history that powerful sects or groups might bring about a fusion of
governmental and religious functions.").
" See John Rawls, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, 212 (1971) ("[A]ssociations may be freely
organized as their members wish, and they may have their own internal life and discipline
subject to the restriction that their members have a real choice of whether to continue their
affiliation.").
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contract law doctrine. Part II describes and motivates the Establishment Clause
nondelegation doctrine stemming from Larkin v. Grendel's Den. Part m
argues that enforcement of religious arbitration agreements may be
unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause nondelegation doctrine.
Finally, Part IV argues that another Establishment Clause doctrine-the
religious question doctrine-does not require enforcement of religious
arbitration agreements.
II. RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND CONTRACT LAW
A "religious arbitration agreement" may be defined as a contract or
contractual provision according to which parties agree to resolve some or all
of their past or future legal disputes through a religiously affiliated arbitrator,
which arbitrator may be a religious leader, a representative of a religious
institution, or a lay person who will conduct the arbitration and issue an award
by reference to specific religious rules or doctrines.1 2
A. Examples ofReligious Arbitration Agreements
Religious arbitration agreements are employed in a variety of
contexts. In some cases, religious institutions have employed religious
arbitration agreements when entering contractual relationships with their
members. These agreements may allow religious institutions to adjudicate
lawsuits brought against them by their members. For example, the Catholic
Church has used binding arbitration to settle lawsuits brought against the
Church by victims of sexual abuse by priests.13 While the mediators and
arbitrators were typically not official representatives of the Church, they were
12 For a useful overview of religious arbitration and other forms of religious dispute
resolution in the U.S., see David Masci & Elizabeth Lawton, Applying God's Law:
Religious Courts and Mediation in the U.S., PEW RESEARCH CTR,
http://www.pewforum.org/2013/04/08/applying-gods-law-religious-courts-and-
mediation-in-the-us/. See also Nicholas Walter, Religious Arbitration in the United States
and Canada, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 501 (2012); Caryn Litt Wolfe, Faith-Based
Arbitration: Friend or Foe-An Evaluation of Religious Arbitration Systems and Their
Interaction with Secular Courts, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 427 (2006).
1 Michelle Rosenblatt, Hidden in the Shadows: The Perilous Use of ADR by the
Catholic Church, 5 PEPP. DisP. RESOL. L. J. 115, 127-9 (2005) (describing binding
mediation/arbitration procedures used to settle lawsuits or to award damages by the
Archdioceses of Milwaukee and Boston).
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often chosen by the Church and were often seen as acting on behalf of the
Church.14
Private individuals may also employ religious arbitration agreements,
especially when entering contractual relationships with coreligionists. For
example, members of many Orthodox and Conservative Jewish communities
employ agreements that direct certain legal disputes to a rabbinical court or
"beth din."15 Agreements to submit legal disputes to a beth din are sometimes
included in commercial contracts, such as sales of goods and property, and
lease agreements.16 They are also commonly employed as part of marriage or
divorce agreements.17 In such cases, while the spouses must go before a civil
court in order to obtain a civil divorce, the court will often defer to the award
of spousal support and division of marital property issued by the beth din on
the grounds that the spouses agreed that the beth din's resolution of disputes
between the parties would be binding.'8
Note that these pre- or postnuptial agreements are also sometimes
used to compel husbands to agree to sign a Jewish divorce or "get."19 Under,
Jewish law, a husband must sign the get or the religious community will not
consider the marriage to be terminated and the wife will not be released from
her religious obligations associated with marriage.2 The husband's refusal to
14 Id at 131-33.
" For a description of the operation of a typical beth din (sometimes transliterated
from the Hebrew to "bet din" or "bais din"), see Masci & Lawton, supra note 12. See also
Helfand, supra note 5, at 1247-49; About Us, BETH DIN OF AMERICA, (last visited Jan. 13,
2018), https://bethdin.org/about/. The prenuptial agreement is available at:
http://www.theprenup.org/pdf/PrenupStandard.pdf.
1 Cf Zeiler v. Deitsch, 500 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that, in a property dispute
between an Israeli citizen and an American citizen, where the parties have agreed to
arbitrate their dispute before a Beth Din panel of three named rabbis, the panel can proceed
to make an award even after one rabbi had resigned).
" See Kent Greenawalt, Religious Law and Civil Law: Using Secular Law to Assure
Observance of Practices with Religious Significance, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 781, 817 (1997)
(discussing legal mechanisms used to compel Orthodox and Conservative Jewish husbands
to submit to Jewish divorce procedures).
1 Greenberg v. Greenberg 238 A.D.2d 420 (N.Y. 1997) (vacating spousal support
award issued by the civil court on the grounds that the wife had signed an agreement
requiring that all disputes between husband and wife be submitted to a "Bais Din" or
Rabbinical Court).
' See discussion in Greenwalt, supra note 17, at 810-16. See also Avitzur v. Avitzur,
446 N.E.2d 136, 138-39 (N.Y. 1983) (compelling former husband's specific performance
in appearing before Beth Din panel in order to initiate religious divorce proceedings, where
civil divorce was already completed), cert. denied 464 U.S. 817 (1983).
2 0See Greenawalt, supra note 17, at 810-16.
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sign the get, especially when a civil divorce has already been granted, prevents
the wife from remarrying under Jewish law, and can lead to other serious social
consequences for the wife within her religious community.2 1 in such cases,
civil courts have enforced the prior agreement by either compelling the
husband's specific performance to appear before a beth din, or by refusing to
grant a civil divorce until the husband submits to the Jewish divorce
procedure.22
Drawing in part on this Orthodox Jewish model of rabbinical
tribunals, some Islamic communities also employ religious courts, in which
Imams and lay community leaders apply Islamic law (Sharia or Shari'ia), to
resolve legal disputes between members, including family law disputes.23 in
the U.S., arbitration agreements are not often used to compel arbitration before
Sharia courts, meaning that he decisions of Sharia courts usually are not
binding in civil court.24 But there has recently been an effort within some
Islamic communities in the U.S. to establish organizations, modeled on the
Beth Din of America, which provides standardized religious arbitration
services.25 And while some legislators have passed laws that prohibit state
courts from enforcing Islamic arbitration agreements, such laws have been
held to be unconstitutional because they discriminate against Islam.26
21 Id. at 810-11, noting that a wife who has obtained a civil divorce but not a religious
divorce is known as "agunah" or "chained woman" because she is chained to her former
husband.
22 See Avitzur, 445 N.E.2d at 138-39 (compelling former husband's specific
performance in appearing before Beth Din panel in order to initiate religious divorce
proceedings, where civil divorce was already completed), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 817
(1983).
23 See, e.g., Masci & Lawton, supra note 12; See also Charles P. Trumbull, Islamic
Arbitration: A New Path for Interpreting Islamic Legal Contracts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 609
(2006).
24 See Helfand, supra note 5, at 1249-52 (noting that while the use of religious
arbitration agreements among Muslims in America is not widespread, there are a number
of organizations working to develop Islamic arbitration panels). Islamic arbitration
agreements are more common in the United Kingdom, where the recently established
Muslim Arbitration Tribunal (MAT) provides services that are similar to those provided
by Beth Din of America. See Bilal M. Choksi, Religious Arbitration in Ontario-Making
the Case Based on the British Example of the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal, 33 U. PA. J.
INT'L L. 791, 812 (2012) (noting that in establishing the MAT, its founder "followed the
Jewish example of the Beit Din rabbinical court.").
2 See Helfand, supra note 5, at 1250 (describing the recent push for Islamic arbitration
services and noting that the Fiqh Council of North America provides some such services).
26 Cf Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1128-29 (10th Cir. 2012) (striking down as
unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause an Oklahoma law prohibiting courts from
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Another common type of religious arbitration agreement, often
employed by Christian corporations and organizations, requires parties to
submit to binding arbitration in accordance with the Rules of Procedure for
Christian Conciliation promulgated by the Institute for Christian Conciliation
(ICC), which is a nondenominational Christian organization that certifies
religious arbitrators.27 These certified arbitrators may be laypersons, but must
affirm a Statement of Faith, adhere to a Standard of Conduct, and take a
Peacemaker's Pledge, all of which contain explicitly religious content.28 The
rules governing the arbitration, as well as the resulting arbitration award, are
justified by reference to religious doctrine, and are intended to be not only
legally binding, but also to express or create religious obligations for the
parties.2 9 Courts have typically enforced agreements that reference the ICC
and its Rules for Christian Conciliation.30
considering Sharia law).
27 The ICC is a division of Peacemaker Ministries, a nonprofit organization based in
Colorado that was originally an offshoot of the Christian Legal Society. See About
Peacemaker Ministries, PEACE MAKER MINISTRIES, (Jan. 19, 2018),
http://peacemaker.net/about/; History, PEACE MAKER MINISTRIES (Jan. 19, 2018),
http://peacemaker.net/history/.
28 See Standard of Conduct, PEACE MAKER MINISTRIES (Jan. 19, 2018),
http://peacemaker.net/project/standard-of-conduct-for-christian-conciliation/. Note that
whether or not they have been Certified all persons using the ICC rules of Procedure must
affirm the Statement of Faith; see The Institute for Christian Conciliation: Dispute
Resolution Services, Rule A. 10(A): Appointment of Conciliators, RULES OF PROCEDURE
(on file with author).
29 Among other things, these Rules provide that the Bible "shall be the supreme
authority governing every aspect of the conciliation process." See The Institute for
Christian Conciliation: Dispute Resolution Services, Rule A. 4: Application ofLaw, RULES
OF PROCEDURE (on file with author).
3 There are numerous reported cases involving arbitration agreements with nearly
identical language providing that legal disputes between the parties will be settled by
"legally binding arbitration in accordance with the Rules of Procedure for Christian
Conciliation of the Institute for Christian Conciliation." See, e.g., Encore Prods., Inc., 53
F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1106 (arbitration agreement in contract for audio-visual services
referring to RPCC); Prescott v. Northlake Christian Sch., 369 F.3d 491 (5th Cir. 2005)
(arbitration agreement in employment contract referring to RPCC); Spivey v. Teen
Challenge of Fla. Inc., 122 So.3d 986, 988 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (service agreement
signed by patient admitted to drug rehabilitation facility providing for binding arbitration
in accordance with RPCC); Higher Ground Worship Ctr., Inc. v. Arks, Inc., No. 1:1 1-cv-
00077-BLW, 2011 WL 4738651, at*1 (D. Idaho Oct. 6, 2011) (arbitration provision in
lease-and-purchase agreement providing for arbitration in accordance with the Rules of
Procedure for Christian Conciliation and citing to Matthew 18:15-20 and 1 Corinthians
6:1-8); Gen. Conf. of Evangelical Methodist Church v. Faith Evangelical Methodist
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These examples divide into two main categories of religious
arbitration agreements: those that provide for arbitration performed by a
religious leader or leaders-such as the Jewish beth din-and those that
provide for a lay arbitrator applying rules that explicitly reference a religious
text, such as the ICC's Rules for Christian Conciliation.3' Both types are
"religious" in the sense that the rules governing the arbitration, as well as the
resulting arbitration award, are justified by reference to religious doctrine, and
are intended to be not only legally binding, but also to express or create
religious obligations for the parties.
In sum, many different types of actors-including individuals and
institutions-may employ religious arbitration agreements in a range of
different types of contractual relationships, and probably for a wide variety of
different reasons. Moreover, religious arbitration agreements may have a
variety of different structures and requirements. What these agreements have
in common is that a court may enforce the agreement, thereby requiring the
parties to resolve their legal dispute in a religious context-before a religious
tribunal, or by reference to religious texts and beliefs.
B. The Enforceability ofReligious Arbitration Agreements
Under Contract Law
Religious arbitration agreements are contractual provisions that derive
legal force from contract law, and in particular, from the presumption in favor
of enforcing arbitration agreements generally. In general, arbitration is an
alternative dispute resolution mechanism whereby parties resolve a private law
dispute by submitting to the judgment of a third-party decisionmaker as an
alternative to filing a lawsuit in civil court. Arbitration provides many of the
features of a civil court proceeding, including the presentation of evidence and
the opportunity to raise defenses. Parties may sometimes prefer arbitration to
civil court because the costs of litigation can be controlled, the availability of
some procedures (such as discovery tools) may be limited, and the proceedings
can be kept private. Parties to a contract may agree to a mandatory arbitration
agreement, according to which parties agree to resolve some or all of their
Church, 809 N.W.2d 117 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011) (arbitration agreement between church and
governing religious body referring to RPCC).
31 Note that, while a party may agree to secular arbitration on the basis of a religious
motivation or a religious belief that arbitration is superior to filing a lawsuit in civil court,
for the purposes of this Article, I will assume that an arbitration agreement makes no
reference of any kind to a religious institution or text is not a "religious arbitration
agreement," even if the motivation for the parties to agree is religious.
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potential future legal disputes through a specified arbitrator or according to a
specified arbitration procedure. Judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements
takes two main forms: A judge may grant a motion to compel arbitration and
to dismiss the suit against a party who brought an action in civil court that was
covered by a prior arbitration agreement; or, ajudge may enforce an arbitration
judgment or award, once issued, against a party who refuses to comply.32
Appealing to contract law principles, courts have generally granted wide
latitude to the parties in constructing arbitration agreements.33 Moreover, the
Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA")-the federal law governing arbitration
agreements-has been interpreted to authorize or require judges to liberally
enforce arbitration agreements against parties who have voluntarily agreed to
them.34
The FAA and related state statutes create a legal presumption in favor
of enforcing religious arbitration agreements. But general doctrines of contract
law may place some important limits on the enforceability of religious
arbitration agreements." Obviously, courts will not enforce an agreement
against a nonparty, or where the agreement was secured through coercion or
fraud. 6 Similarly, courts have vacated awards issued by religious arbitrators
32 For a general discussion of the function of arbitration agreements, see generally
Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through
Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703 (1998).
" See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 351 (2011) ("Arbitration is
a matter of contract, and the FAA requires courts to honor parties' expectations.").
3 The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, applies to all contracts within
the stream of commerce under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. See Moses
H. Cone Mem'1 Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (construing Section
2 of the FAA as "a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary");
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (holding that the FAA applied to contracts
under state law).
" Under Section 2 of the FAA, an arbitration agreement may be invalidated by
contract defenses such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability. But see Rent-A-Center, W.,
Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 68-73 (2010) (holding that where provided by the agreement,
an arbitrator may determine the enforceability of the arbitration agreement).
36 See Doe v. Vineyard Columbus, No. 13AP-599, 2014 WL 2781594, at *3-6 (Ohio
Ct. App. June 17, 2014) (holding that there was no meeting of the minds regarding
arbitration agreement where plaintiff, a church member suing the Church, had attended a
"Newcomer's class" where she was allegedly presented with a booklet containing an
arbitration provision referring to the ICC's Rules of Christian Conciliation, but had not
signed anything containing such a provision); McArthur v. McArthur, 168 Cal. Rptr. 3d
785 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (declining to enforce religious arbitration agreement entered into
by benefactor and trustee against a trust beneficiary who was not a party to the agreement).
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when the award would violate the rights or negatively impact the interests of
third parties, especially children. In particular, courts have declined to enforce
the judgments of religious arbitrators with respect to child custody upon
divorce, where the court judges the arbitrator's child custody award would not
be in the best interests of the child.37 In general, the decision of a court to
vacate a child custody award generally does not turn on the fact that the
arbitration is religious."8
The exploitation of an unequal bargaining position between the parties
may also render an arbitration agreement unenforceable. These concerns may
be more acute when religious persons feel significant pressure to agree to
religious arbitration in some cases, especially if entering an arbitration
agreement is necessary to maintain membership or standing in a religious
community, to fulfill a perceived religious obligation, or to receive a service
provided by a religious institution, such as the sanctification of marriage or
religious recognition of divorce.39 For example, in Lieberman v. Lieberman, a
party moved to vacate an award issued by a beth din on the grounds that she
had agreed to religious arbitration under threat of a "Sirov" or public "decree
that subjects the recipient to shame, scorn, ridicule and public ostracism by
other members of the Jewish religious community."4 0 The court in this case
held that threat of public shame and ostracism is not sufficient to constitute
" See, e.g., Hirsch v. Hirsch, 774 N.Y.S.2d 48, 49 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) ("Disputes
concerning child custody and visitation are not subject to arbitration."); Kovacs v. Kovacs,
633 A.2d 425 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) (vacating judgment of Beth Din panel with
respect to child custody on grounds that trial court must independently review to ensure
that the judgment was in the best interests of the child); Lieberman v. Lieberman, 566
N.Y.S.2d 490 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991) (vacating Beth Din panel's award ofjoint custody of
children on grounds that it would be averse to the children's interests). See Helfand, supra
note 5, at 1288-94 (discussing courts' use of a public policy rationale to vacate religious
arbitration awards).
3 Cf Brisman v. Hebrew Academy of Five Towns & Rockaway, 895 N.Y.S.2d 482
(N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (enforcing religious arbitration award over objection that it violated
public policy and was irrational, by applying standard New York state law providing that
"[a]n arbitration award can be vacated by a court pursuant to CPLR 7511(b) on only three
narrow grounds: if it is clearly violative of a strong public policy, if it is totally or
completely irrational, or if it manifestly exceeds a specific, enumerated limitation on the
arbitrators' power."). Courts generally claim a parens patriae responsibility to employ
oversight and fact-finding to determine whether a child custody award issued by an
arbitrator is in the child or children's best interests. Cf Jack Ratliff, Parens Patriae: An
Overview, 74 TUL. L. REv. 1847 (1999).
" See discussion in Helfand, supra note 5, at 1294-1304.
40 See Lieberman v. Lieberman, 566 N.Y.S.2d 490, 494 (N.Y Sup. Ct. 1991).
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duress, even for one living in an insular religious community.41 Yet, some have
argued that religious pressure of this sort should in some cases be sufficient to
render the arbitration agreement unenforceable on grounds of duress or
procedural unconscionability.42
Finally, like other arbitration agreements, religious arbitration
agreements may be unenforceable if they are procedurally and substantive
unconscionable. 43 There may be a concern that religious arbitration
agreements will tend to be substantively unconscionable because the
arbitration procedure will not be fair or neutral. This concern may be
especially acute where religious institutions are allowed to arbitrate their own
disputes, or appoint arbitrators who are affiliated with the religious institution.
For example, in Garcia v. Church of Scientology, the parties signed an
arbitration agreement that specified no rules or procedures in advance and
required all three of the appointed arbitrators be "[s]cientologists in good
standing with the Mother Church.4 4 However, the plaintiffs claimed that
because they had been declared to be "suppressives" by the church, all
Scientologists "in good standing" would be required by church doctrine to be
biased against them. " Thus, the plaintiffs argued that their arbitration
proceeding could not be conducted in a neutral manner.
The facts in this case might be sufficient for a finding of substantive
unconscionability. If it was not possible for the plaintiffs to receive a fair
hearing with respect to their fraud claim, the court should be reluctant to
enforce the arbitration agreement against them.46 However, the court in this
41 Id. (enforcing terms of beth din divorce settlement, including awards of spousal
support and division of marital assets, over wife's objection that she had signed arbitration
agreement under duress).
42 Cf Helfand, supra note 5, at 1294-1304 (arguing that "expanding the use of the
unconscionability doctrine in the review of religious arbitration agreements could provide
a doctrinal mechanism to protect religionists from the freedom-restricting qualities of
religious arbitration.").
43 See, e.g, Higher Ground Worship Ctr. v. Arks, Inc., No. 1:1 1-cv-00077-BLW,
2011 WL 4738651, at *4 (D. Idaho Oct. 6, 2011) (denying motion to compel religious
arbitration where lease-and-purchase agreement between church and a Christian
construction company was found to be both procedurally and substantively unconscionable
on the grounds that the property owner, Arks, retained access to civil court-for suits
involving the nonpayment of rent-but the leaseholder, Higher Ground, was allowed no
access to civil court).
" Garcia v. Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org., No. 8:13-cv-220-T-27TBM, 2015
WL 10844160, at *2 (D. Fla. March 13, 2015)
4 5 1d at *11.
46 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985) ("By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive
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case rejected the plaintiffs' arguments on the grounds that the Establishment
Clause would prohibit the court from investigating whether Scientologist
arbitration proceedings are fair.47 Thus, while there may be concerns about the
fairness of religious arbitrators with respect to certain claimants or certain
claims, courts may be reluctant to pry too deeply into the inner workings of a
religious arbitration procedure.
In sum, courts generally treat religious arbitration agreements on a par
with secular arbitration agreements. Religious arbitration agreements are
liberally enforced under the FAA and related state statutes that authorize
courts to enforce arbitration agreements generally. Judicial enforcement of
religious arbitration agreements has been limited only by contract law
doctrines that also apply to secular arbitration agreements, such as fraud,
duress, and unconscionability. In some cases, such as Garcia, courts have held
religious arbitration agreements to be enforceable even where a secular
arbitration agreement might not be, on the grounds that the Establishment
Clause prevents courts from investigating the adequacy of the religious
arbitration procedure. The rest of this Article will consider an argument based
in the Establishment Clause that has not been considered by courts, namely,
that enforcement of religious arbitration clauses constitutes an impermissible
delegation of government authority to religious institutions or groups.
III. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE "NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE"
As discussed in Part I, courts generally enforce religious arbitration
agreements so long as they are enforceable under basic contract law. But the
religious nature of these agreements raises a question about their
enforceability under the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. The
current Establishment Clause doctrine is rather fragmented, with several
different tests used to decide different types of cases.4 8 As a result, its
application is unsettled and often open to debate.
In order to set up arguments in subsequent sections of this Article, Part
H will describe one specific Establishment Clause doctrine: the nondelegation
doctrine. According to the nondelegation doctrine, the government may not
rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than
ajudicial, forum.").
4 7 d. (noting that the Church's International Justice Chief testified that the procedures
would be neutral, but that the "First Amendment prohibits consideration of this
contention").
4 See Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status and Prospects of "Tests" Under the
Religion Clauses, 1995 SUP. CT. REv. 323 (1995).
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delegate important powers-especially legal functions-to religious bodies
where that delegation results in a "fusion of governmental and religious
functions."4 9 The nondelegation doctrine was first articulated in Larkin v.
Grendel's Den, a case involving a state law that granted any church (or place
of worship) the power to veto an application for a liquor license application
within 500 feet of church property."o Drawing an analogy to arrangements in
England at the time of the framing, whereby church officials held legal control
over the liquor trade, the Supreme Court struck down the law on the grounds
that it delegated the government's authority to grant liquor licenses to religious
institutions, resulting in a "a fusion of governmental and religious functions.""
A subsequent case reflects a similar concern about religious
institutions acquiring control over the state's policymaking authority. In
Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet, the Court struck down a state
law authorizing the creation of a public school district designed to exclusively
serve a Hasidic Jewish community in upstate New York.52 A plurality of the
Justices reasoned that the state law was an impermissible delegation under
Larkin because it allowed a religious group-in particular, the religious
leaders of the village-to effectively take control of the town's public school
district." Although the delegation in this case was indirect-a result of the fact
See Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116, 126 (1982). Note that there has been
disagreement among the Justices as to how the nondelegation doctrine fits into
Establishment Clause doctrine. Justice Blackmun argued that it is an application of the
second and third prongs of the Lemon test in Bd of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist v.
Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 710 (1994) (Blackmun, J., concurring). On the other hand, Justice
O'Connor argued that it stands apart from the Lemon test. Id. at 720-21 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). For a standard statement of the nondelegation doctrine, see "Excessive
entanglement rule" 16A Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 441 (the government may not
delegate its authority on the basis of religious criteria where said delegation would result
in a "fusion" of government and religious functions).
50 Larkin, 459 U.S at 126.
i Id at 126-27 n. 10, (citing Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203,
222 (1963) and 26 Geo. 2, Ch. 31, § 2 (1753) (church officials in England were given
authority to grant certificate of character, a prerequisite for an alehouse license)).
52 Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 690 (holding that creation of school district by state
legislature intended to serve a village populated exclusively by members of a single
Jewish community violated the Establishment Clause). Note that although Justices
Kennedy and O'Connor concurred in judgment, they each based their opinion on
somewhat different grounds. Justice O'Connor, was concerned to distance her opinion
from the controversial Lemon test, not from the nondelegation rationale found in Larkin.
See id at 718-19 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971)).
5 Id at 696-97, 699 (citing Larkin, 459 U.S. at 122).
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that a single religious group occupied an entire town-the plurality reasoned
that the delegation of governmental authority was unconstitutional in a similar
way.54 It is debatable whether such an indirect delegation raises the same
problems as the direct delegation in Larkin." But if the leaders of the Hasidic
community had been able to exercise control over the district's school board,
the concern is that they would acquire an ability to create and implement
policies in the name of the school district. The impermissible fusion in this
case would result from the fact that these religious leaders acquired effective
control over the governmental function of administering the public schools.
Extrapolating from Larkin and Kiryas Joel, there may be an Establishment
Clause concern where three conditions obtain: (i) the government makes a
religion-specific delegation (ii) to a religious institution or institutions, (iii)
which allows that institution to acquire effective control over a core
governmental power such as legislation or policymaking.
Such a delegation is problematic for at least two reasons. First, the
delegation creates the risk that religious institutions may shape the policies so
as to favor their own religious ends or purposes, rather than those of the
community. That is, religious institutions that acquire legal authority may seek
to benefit those who are affiliated with their religious group or use the state's
authority to impose religious rules on their own members. For example, a
school district designed to serve a single religious community, such as Kiryas
Joel, may limit the ability of some students to access public education within
the district. The school district might implement policies that exclude or
disadvantage non-Jewish students. Or, alternatively, the district might
implement policies designed to exclude Jewish students from public school so
that they will be required to attend parochial school."6
Second, a delegation of the state's legislative authority to religious
institutions is problematic because it puts a religious institution in a position
where it can directly control the community's shared normative and legal
5
4 Id. at 704-05.
" Note that Justice Scalia argued in dissent that the plurality opinion elided a
distinction between the religious leaders of the Jewish community in Kiryas Joel, and the
residents of the village who have actual legal authority to elect members of the school
board. See Kiryas Joel 512 U.S. at 734-35 (Scalia, J., dissenting). It may have been likely
that the voters would elect religious leaders who would have run the school district in a
way that reflects the values and policies of the religious group-but this is an assumption
not based on the factual record of the case. But for my purposes, I will assume that he
plurality opinion represents a useful doctrinal point, so long as we assume that the religious
institution would have acquired effective control over the town's school board. It does not
matter for my purposes whether the case itself was correctly decided.
5 Compare to Kiryas Joel 512 U.S. at 694 (noting that all children in the village aside
from special education students attend Jewish parochial schools).
352
[Vol. 33:3 20181
RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
agenda and goals via legal or political mechanisms. Even if the rights and
interests of individuals are unaffected by the delegation-e.g., if the churches
in Larkin never vetoed a liquor license application-the delegation is
problematic because religious institutions could insert their normative
reasoning and judgment into the community's legislative or policymaking
process. This decentralization of legal authority would result in the loss of a
shared normative space where all citizens can interact as equals.
IV. WHY ENFORCEMENT OF RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
MAY VIOLATE THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
This Part of the Article argues that enforcement of religious arbitration
agreements may be an impermissible delegation under the Establishment
Clause nondelegation doctrine discussed in Part II. As discussed above,
whether a delegation is problematic turns on whether (i) the government
makes a religion-specific delegation, (ii) to a religious institution or
institutions, (iii) which allows that institution to acquire effective control over
a core governmental power such as legislation or policymaking. Thus, the
question of whether the judicial enforcement of religious arbitration
agreements is an impermissible delegation turns on three key issues: first,
whether the judicial enforcement of religious arbitration agreements is a
delegation specific to religious groups, or merely the result of private choices;
second, whether the delegation would be to the religious institutions or
"bodies" of the appropriate type; and third, whether the power to resolve civil
legal disputes is a core "governmental power" of the sort that may not be
delegated to religious institutions. I will address each question in turn.
A. Religion-Specific Delegation
The first question to consider is whether the judicial enforcement of
religious arbitration agreements is a religion-specific delegation made by the
state. In the context of the nondelegation doctrine, a "religion-specific
delegation" is a delegation made by the government to a specific religious
institution or group, or to religious groups generally, rather than a broad
delegation to individuals whose religious affiliation, if any, is incidental to the
delegation.57 For example, in Kiryas Joel, the state legislature passed a special
57 See id. at 699 ("Where 'fusion' is an issue, the difference lies in the distinction
between a government's purposeful delegation on the basis of religion and a delegation on
principles neutral to religion, to individuals whose religious identities are incidental to their
353
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
law authorizing creation of a school district for the Village of Kiryas Joel in
particular, fully aware of the fact that the village was populated exclusively by
members of a Satmar Hasidic Jewish community." The state's ad hoc or case-
specific creation of a new school district just for this village is problematic
because other similarly situated groups may not receive the same treatment.59
Compare to Commack v. Weiss, a case in which a New York court struck down
a state law defining and regulating the use of the word kosher on food labels
in terms of a certain specific Orthodox Jewish understanding of that term.6 0
The law was an unconstitutional delegation because it created an "advisory
board on kosher law enforcement" composed exclusively of Orthodox Rabbis
that was granted "extremely broad" power to oversee administration and
enforcement of the law.61 Appealing to Larkin and Kiryas Joel, the Second
Circuit reasoned that the kosher food-labeling statute had the "primary effect"
of "advanc[ing]" Orthodox Judaism over other Jewish groups, and also of
"inhibit[ing]" other Jewish groups from "using the kosher label in accordance
with their religious beliefs."62 Thus, the effect of a religion-specific delegation
receipt of civic authority.").
" Id at 703 (the plurality reasoned that the legislature's authorization of this single
school district was "anomalously [and] case-specific," preventing the Court from ensuring
that the legislature was not acting in such a way as to "prefer one religion to another, or
religion to irreligion.").
s See id. ("The fundamental source of constitutional concern here is that the
legislature itself may fail to exercise governmental authority in a religiously neutral way.
The anomalously case-specific nature of the legislature's exercise of state authority in
creating this district for a religious community leaves the Court without any direct way to
review such state action for the purpose of safeguarding a principle at the heart of the
Establishment Clause, that government should not prefer one religion to another, or
religion to irreligion" (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52-54 (1985); Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968); Sch. Dist. Of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 216-217 (1963))).
6o Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Weiss, 294 F.3d 415, 418, 425 (2d
Cir. 2002) (striking down a kosher food-labeling law according to which "kosher" foods
must be "prepared in accordance with orthodox Hebrew religious requirements" on the
grounds that the law would "create an impermissible fusion of governmental and religious
functions by delegating civic authority to individuals apparently chosen according to
religious criteria.").611 d at 418.
62 Id. at 430 (holding that the challenged kosher food statutes "fail the second prong
of the Lemon test"). For a case with similar facts and similar reasoning, see A.C.L.U. v.
Sebelius, 821 F. Supp. 2d 474 (D. Mass. 2013) (holding that contract between the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services and a Catholic organization, according to
which organizations would receive funding to aid victims of human trafficking on the
condition that their services were not used to provide abortion services or contraceptive
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is to impermissibly favor a particular religious group or religion generally as
against those who do not receive the delegation.
The religion-specific delegations in Larkin, Kiryas Joel, and
Commack may be contrasted with State v. Yencer, a North Carolina case
involving a state law that authorized the state Attorney General to deputize
employees of private colleges in the state as campus police officers.63 The law
extended this opportunity to all private colleges in the state, including
religiously affiliated colleges.' When a citizen who was arrested by a campus
police officer employed by a religious college challenged the constitutionality
of the law on Establishment Clause grounds, the North Carolina Supreme
Court held that because the law did not delegate authority to religious colleges
in particular, but to all private colleges, the law was permissible under the
nondelegation doctrine." Because the law was of general application, there
was no concern that different religions, or religion in general, had received
impermissible favorable treatment.
Turning now to religious arbitration agreements, it may seem that in a
given case, the court is not delegating authority to the religious arbitrator, but
is simply deferring to the decision to arbitrate made by the parties to the
agreement. If the government is making a delegation of authority, it is at the
level of the state's generally applicable law or policy authorizing courts to
enforce such agreements across the board, both religious and the (more
materials, was an unconstitutional delegation because it vested the religious group with too
much authority over how to execute the government's policy); vacated on mootness
grounds, A.C.L.U v. United States Conf. of Catholic Bishops, 705 F.3d 44 (1st Cir. 2013).
For a helpful discussion of kosher food-labeling cases, see Kent Greenawalt, Religious
Law and Civil Law: Using Secular Law to Assure Observance ofPractices with Religious
Significance, 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 781 (1997).
63 State v. Yencer, 718 S.E.2d 615 (N.C. 2011) (holding that general state law
providing for the deputization of private college employees to serve as campus police
officers was constitutional even when applied to private liberal arts college that was
established by, and voluntarily affiliated with, the Presbyterian Church). Note that the
holding in Yencer appears to conflict with, and essentially to overturn, an earlier North
Carolina case with similar facts. See State v. Pendleton, 451 S.E.2d 274 (N.C. 1994)
(holding under the Establishment Clause that state law deputizing private college
employees to serve as campus police officers was unconstitutional as applied to religiously
affiliated colleges). See discussion in Jun Xiang, The Confusion of Fusion: Inconsistent
Application of the Establishment Clause Nondelegation Rule in State Courts, 113 COLUM.
L.R. 777 (2013) (noting that neither the case law nor the statute at issue had changed in the
years between Pendleton and Yencer).
6 Yencer, 718 S.E.2d at 620.
65 Id
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commonplace) nonreligious variety.66 But unlike in Larkin, where the state
delegated legal authority explicitly to churches, a policy that applies to both
religious and secular arbitration agreements may not seem to involve a
delegation to religious institutions. Unless there is an explicit or deliberate
delegation to religious institutions, it may be unclear what makes delegation
so problematic. After all, explicitly delegating authority to religious groups
raises concerns about state favoritism toward religion, while explicitly
excluding religious entities from a general policy would seem to raise concerns
about state discrimination against religion.6 7
Generally applicable laws, which equally affect religious as well as
nonreligious entities, do not constitute impermissible delegations. But with
respect to religious arbitration agreements, the impermissible delegation may
occur at the time of enforcement itself-that is, when the court enforces a
religious arbitration agreement against a particular litigant in a specific case.
In this respect, judicial enforcement of religious arbitration agreements may
be analogous to the judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants at
issue in Shelley v. Kraemer.68 In this famous case, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that courts may not enforce racially restrictive covenants against parties
who sought to sell their land to African American (or non-white) buyers.
Racially restrictive covenants were conditions added to property deeds that
prohibited the sale of the property to non-white buyers and were an important
aspect of the effort to "redline" or racially segregate cities and towns
throughout the U.S.6 9 Covenants that place restrictions on land use or sale are
commonplace in property law and are routinely enforced by courts. But in
Shelley, the Court held that judicial enforcement of racially restrictive
covenants would amount to state engagement in the unconstitutional practice
of racial segregation of housing. Although the covenants themselves were the
product of private choices made by individual non-state actors-choices that
' The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, applies to all contracts within
the stream of commerce under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
17 Compare to Yencer, 718 S.E.2d 615 (holding that a generally applicable a state law
allowing employees of any private college in the state, including religiously affiliated
colleges, to be deputized as campus police officers was not an impermissible delegation
under the Establishment Clause).
61 See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (holding that judicial enforcement
of racially restrictive real estate covenants violates the Equal Protection Clause).
6 See for example RICHARD R. W. BROOKS & CAROL M. ROSE, SAVING THE
NEIGHBORHOOD: RACIALLY RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS, LAW, AND SOCIAL NORMS 162
(2013) (describing zoning laws, racially restrictive covenants, and the "ethics" codes of
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are typically respected by the private law and enforced by courts-the judicial
enforcement of these covenants is a form of state activity that may have
problematic effects both in the particular case and on society as a whole. For
this reason, the judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants may be
rightly subject to constitutional scrutiny.70
Much like racially restrictive covenants, religious arbitration
agreements may not be a merely private matter, on par with other arbitration
agreements that are generally enforced by courts. Enforcement of religious
arbitration agreements may impact the legal rights of individual litigants,
especially if the parties' respective religious beliefs or affiliations may affect
the outcome of the arbitration. In addition, by analogy with redlining,
consistent judicial enforcement of religious arbitration agreements may result
in the fracturing of the legal landscape, whereby religious and nonreligious
citizens adjudicate their private law disputes in separate legal venues. Judicial
enforcement of religious arbitration agreements may also result in patterns of
governmental favoritism toward certain religious groups, since some religious
groups may be less sophisticated than others in drafting the agreements or -in
seeking their enforcement by courts, leaving them disadvantaged relative to
other groups who have the requisite legal experience to execute the
agreements. Inequality of enforcement is a special concern considering
attempts by some U.S. state legislatures to impose restrictions on the ability of
courts to consider Islamic law or Sharia.
Because judicial enforcement of religious arbitration agreements may
result in significant effects-both for individual litigants and for society as a
whole-which are specific to religious arbitration agreements, there may be
reason for the state to consider religious arbitration agreements separately
from the nonreligious variety. Much like racially restrictive covenants, they
are arguably different in kind from the garden-variety legal mechanism on
which they are based. Given this difference, the state must decide whether or
not to enforce them on the same terms as other arbitration agreements. This
choice-whether it is made by a legislature or a court-ought to be subject to
considerations ofjustice, and in the U.S. system, to principles of constitutional
law. Enforcement of religious arbitration agreements thus seems to be a state
activity, and not merely the result of the private choices of the parties to the
agreement.
70 The "state action doctrine" aspect of Shelley, 334 U.S. I has been widely debated.
See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U. L. REv 503, 524-25
(1985).
7 See Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1128-29 (10th Cir. 2012) (holding under the
Establishment Clause that an Oklahoma law prohibiting courts from considering Sharia
law in particular was unconstitutional because it singled out Islam).
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To determine whether enforcement of religious arbitration agreements
is a religion-specific delegation on the part of the government, we should look
to the reasons why delegations are problematic. A delegation of governmental
power to religious group is especially problematic when it is case-specific. A
case-specific delegation leaves open the possibility that the government may
not grant similar powers to other similarly situated religious groups. By
making a case-specific delegation, the government risks favoring a particular
religious group, or religion generally, as against those groups that may not
receive a similar delegation. As in Kiryas Joel, the constitutionality of a
delegation does not depend on an actual showing that the government has
treated other religious groups unfairly; it is enough that the government has
acted in a "case-specific" way, which "leaves the Court without any direct way
to review such state action".72 While courts may review generally applicable
statutes and policies to determine whether they are discriminatory, review of
the overall pattern of judicial enforcement or nonenforcement of arbitration
agreements is unavailable.
Moreover, it seems likely that judicial enforcement of religious
arbitration agreements may result in patterns of governmental favoritism
toward certain religious groups, since there is no guarantee that courts will
treat all religious arbitration agreements equally. Some religious groups may
be less sophisticated than others in drafting the agreements or in seeking their
enforcement by courts, leaving them disadvantaged relative to other groups
who have the requisite legal experience to execute the agreements. Moreover,
some religious groups might face implicit bias on the part of judges, leading
to unequal patterns of enforcement. The presence of concerns about
discriminatory treatment of different religious groups supports the conclusion
that enforcement of religious arbitration agreements may be a religion-specific
delegation for purposes of state action doctrine analysis.
B. Delegation to a Religious Institution or Entity
The second question to consider is whether the enforcement of a
religious arbitration agreement will generally involve making a delegation to
72 Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 703 (1994).
("The anomalously case-specific nature of the legislature's exercise of state authority in
creating this district for a religious community leaves the Court without any direct way to
review such state action for the purpose of safeguarding a principle at the heart of the
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a "religious institution."73 The law at issue in Larkin delegated the power to
veto liquor licenses to all churches or places of worship, which clearly qualify
as religious institutions.74 Similarly, the kosher food labeling law in Commack
delegated authority to a panel of religious leaders acting, presumably, in their
official religious capacity to provide guidelines and judgments about what
food qualified as kosher." Drawing on these examples, where a religious
arbitration is conducted by an ordained religious leader or a religious official
acting on behalf of a religious institution such as a church, there is little doubt
that the delegation is being made to a religious institution for purposes of
applying the nondelegation doctrine.
By contrast, the establishment of the school district at issue in Kiryas
Joel was less obviously a delegation to a religious institution in the relevant
sense. Recall that the statute in question delegated authority to create the
school district to the citizens of Kiryas Joel, not to a religious institution. As
Justice Scalia argued in dissent, Justice Souter's plurality opinion elides a
distinction between the religious leaders of the Jewish community in Kiryas
Joel, and the residents of the village who have actual legal authority to elect
members of the school board. 76 It may have been likely that the voters would
elect religious leaders who would have run the school district in a way that
reflects the values and policies of the religious group-but this is an
assumption based on no fact in the record.
The comparably hard case in the context of religious arbitration is
whether a lay arbitrator who makes reference to religious doctrines and texts,
such as those certified by the Institute for Christian Conciliation ("ICC"),
qualifies as a religious institution under the nondelegation doctrine.78 It may
be useful to compare the ICC-certified arbitrators to the religiously affiliated
private college at issue in Yencer, Davidson College.79 Davidson College is
voluntarily affiliated with the Presbyterian Church of the United States of
" See Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116, 127 (1982).
74 Id. at 117 n.l (noting that the state law at issue defined "church" to be "a church or
synagogue building dedicated to divine worship and in regular use for that purpose").
7 Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Weiss, 294 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2002).
76 Cf Kiryas Joel 512 U.S. at 734-35 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that under
Larkin, a delegation is impermissible only if it is a delegation of "civil authority to a
church" (italics in original)).
7 Cf Christopher L. Eisgruber, Madison's Wager: Religious Liberty in the
Constitutional Order, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 347, 402-08 (1995) (arguing that the Kiryas Joel
school district was an unconstitutional segregation of public school students along
religious lines, not a delegation).
78 See supra Part 1.
7 See generally State v. Yencer, 718 S.E.2d 615 (N.C. 2011).
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America, and its bylaws require that its President be a member of that
Church.so Davidson does not, however, require that students or faculty have
religious affiliation or attend religious services." The court in Yencer held that
Davidson was not a religious institution in the relevant sense, reasoning that
its "predominate purpose" is to provide "secular education."82
How, then, should a court determine whether enforcing a religious
arbitration conducted by a layperson is a delegation to a religious institution
in the relevant sense? The Yencer court suggests atest-that is, courts should
not look at the nominal religious or nonreligious affiliation of the delegated
institution, but should determine whether the "predominate purpose" of the
institution is secular or religious. Given this test, a religiously affiliated
arbitrator providing secular arbitration services may not qualify as religious
under the nondelegation doctrine. But there are reasons to think that ICC-
certified arbitrators would qualify as religious. As discussed in Part I, ICC
arbitrators must follow the Rules of Procedure for Christian Conciliation,
according to which "the Holy Scriptures (the Bible) shall be the supreme
authority governing every aspect of the conciliation process."8 Moreover,
certified Conciliators must take a pledge according to which "we believe that
we are called to respond to conflict in a way that is remarkably different from
the way the world deals with conflict." 84 These facts about ICC-based
arbitration suggest hat the "predominate purpose" of such arbitration may be
religious, rather than secular.
In sum, the enforcement of a religious arbitration agreement will
typically result in a delegation to a religious body or institution under the
nondelegation doctrine. There may be some vagueness or ambiguity about
what qualifies as a "religious institution" for the purposes of the doctrine:
churches and ordained religious leaders acting in their official capacity are
clear cases, while religiously affiliated laypersons may not be. Applying the
test suggested by the court in Yencer, whether the institution or individual who
conducts the arbitration is "religious" under the nondelegation doctrine may
depend on whether the "predominate purpose" of conducting the arbitration is
religious. Thus, it may matter whether the arbitrator views itself as providing
s0 Id at 618-19.
81 Id
82 Id at 621-622.
8 The Institute for Christian Conciliation: Dispute Resolution Services, supra note
29.
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a predominately secular legal service, or as providing a predominately
religious mediation or reconciliation service.
C. Effective Control Over an Important Governmental Power
The final factor to consider is whether, by enforcing a religious
arbitration agreement, a court has made a delegation of an "important" or
"core" governmental power, i.e., one that is "ordinarily vested in agencies of
government."" In Larkin, the power in question is the power to grant liquor
licenses; in Kiryas Joel, it is the power to administer a public school district;
in Commack, it is the power to regulate food labeling. These powers are not
distinctive because the government may never delegate them-indeed, the
Court in Larkin suggested that the government could permissibly delegate its
authority to issue liquor licenses to a nongovernmental entity, as long as it
were not religious. " Instead, what distinguishes these important or core
governmental powers is that they all bear the government's imprimatur-i.e.,
they are functions that, within our current system, are closely associated with
governmental authority, and over which the government is assumed to have
primary legal or political authority and for which the government bears
ultimate moral and political responsibility. For example, the government has
primary authority to enforce the criminal law, and yet the government is not
the only actor allowed in the domain: citizens have the authority to make
arrests in some cases, and the government may delegate some functions to
private actors such as private prisons, or the campus police at issue in Yencer.
But enforcement of the criminal law is an important governmental power,
since, like public education and food and liquor regulation, the government
bears ultimate responsibility for its enforcement and oversees all other actors
in the domain.
An impermissible fusion may occur when the government delegates
effective or de facto control over one of these important powers to a religious
institution. In Larkin, the Court argued that the law at issue granted churches
"unilateral and absolute power" to exercise a veto over liquor licenses within
the 500-foot zone. 8' Although the government retained primary de jure
" Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116, 122 (1982).
86 Id.; See also a subsequent case involving the same plaintiff, Commack Self-Service
Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Hooker, 680 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 2012) (upholding against
constitutional challenge a state law allowing any ordained Rabbi to certify food "kosher"
for purposes of food labeling on the grounds that the state had effectively exited the domain
of kosher food labeling).87 Larkin, 459 U.S. at 127.
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authority to grant liquor licenses, the law at issue allowed churches to act as
the de facto liquor license board with respect to the area around their property.
Similarly, in Kiryas Joel, the Court was concerned that, although the school
district would be public in name, the religious leaders in the village would
acquire de facto control over many aspects of the schooling. " And in
Commack, the impermissible delegation resulted from the fact that the board
of Orthodox Rabbis was granted de facto authority to determine which foods
may be labeled kosher according to state law.89 In all three cases, a religious
institution or group acquires unilateral or absolute de facto control over a
governmental function, as evidenced by the fact that it would it be effective to
petition the religious institution directly about a delegated matter rather than
petition the state. Under the facts in Larkin, if someone sought to open a liquor
store within 500 feet of a church, she would likely need to seek the permission
of the church directly. Similarly, if a grocer wanted to label its food kosher
given the law in Commack, it should seek the approval of the Board of
Orthodox Rabbis rather than the government agency. Thus, an impermissible
fusion results when a religious institution or group acquires absolute or
unchecked de facto control over a function that nevertheless remains legally
under primary governmental authority.
Turning to religious arbitration agreements, there is a strong argument
that the adjudication and enforcement of the private law is one of the
government's core functions in the sense that this power is "ordinarily vested
in agencies of government."9 0 Adjudication and enforcement of the private
law ordinarily bears the government's imprimatur, as evidenced by the fact
that civil courts are housed in public buildings and staffed by government
employees. Moreover, enforcement of civil law is backed by the state's
authority to use coercive force. The state's civil law adjudication is not simply
a form of nonbinding mediation-the state may resort to coercive force to
render judgments when necessary. Private actors may have a role to play,
including drafting enforceable contracts, filing lawsuits, and even private
arbitrators helping to resolve disputes. But so long as the state's coercive
enforcement may be brought to bear, the state bears ultimately responsibility
for the outcome. It may be possible, in theory, for the government o surrender
its de jure authority to enforce the civil law, by ceding the authority to govern
"8Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
8 Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats, Inc., 294 F.3d at 418.
90 See, e.g., CHARLES DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAwS [1748], Book XI, Ch.
VI, 156-57 (Anne M. Cohler, Basta C. Miller, & Harold Stone trans., 1989) (identifying
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all private noncriminal interactions between citizens to nongovernmental
institutions. It is unclear whether surrendering authority would be consistent
with maintaining a coherent form of government.9 1 But even if such a forfeit
of governmental authority over civil law enforcement were possible, it has not
yet taken place in the U.S.
Assuming that civil law enforcement is a core legal function, the
second aspect of impermissible delegation is whether enforcement of a
religious arbitration agreement allows a religious institution to acquire
significant control over the enforcement of the civil law. There is a strong
argument that enforcement of such agreements does result in the acquisition
of significant control by religious institutions. Litigants who have entered into
such agreements are prevented from seeking alternative means of
adjudication. And awards or judgments issued by religious arbitrators may be
enforced by the state's civil court, including through use of coercion. Although
courts retain the ability to review arbitration awards, courts routinely enforce
those awards except in special cases, such as child custody awards.92 Thus the
awards issues by religious arbitrators are roughly as binding on litigants as the
awards issued by the state's civil courts. And because the proceedings may be
private, religious arbitrators have arguably more leeway and less precedential
constraint in making their judgment.
Enforcement of religious arbitration agreements may be contrasted
with a limited delegation in which the government retains control over the
delegated function. Consider State v. Yencer, a North Carolina case involving
a law allowing the state to deputize employees of private colleges, including
religiously affiliated colleges, as campus police officers with the power to
issue tickets and make arrests.93 Although this is a close case, it could be
argued that deputized officers at religious colleges did not acquire sufficient
control over criminal law enforcement o raise constitutional concerns.9 4 After
all, whatever enforcement action a campus police officer might take will be
subject to the review of a criminal court, not simply the campus police or the
91 Note that even Robert Nozick's vision of utopian form of government he "minimal
state" would have the power to enforce contracts. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE,
AND UTOPIA (1974).
92 Courts generally claim a parens patriae responsibility to determine whether a child
custody award issued by an arbitrator is in the child's best interests. See Jack Ratliff,
Parens Patriae: An Overview, 74 TUL. L. REv. 1847 (1999).
9 State v. Yencer, 718 S.E. 2d 615 (N.C. 2011) (upholding law deputizing private
college campus police offices against Establishment Clause challenge).
94 Compare Yencer with an earlier North Carolina case with similar facts, State v.
Pendleton, 451 S.E.2d 274 (N.C. 1994) (holding under the Establishment Clause that state
law deputizing private college employees to serve as campus police officers was
unconstitutional as applied to religiously affiliated colleges).
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college administrators. Any ticket or arrest issued by a police officer may be
challenged before a criminal judge, and the campus police have no authority
to render criminal judgments. So, although campus police may exercise
coercive authority at the point of arrest, they may lack the level of control that
would result in an impermissible delegation of the state's authority over the
criminal law.
By contrast, enforcement of religious arbitration agreements provides
religious arbitrators with significant control over civil law enforcement. The
judgments issued by religious arbitrators are binding on the litigants in civil
court. And civil courts may often enforce the awards issued by religious
arbitrators directly, without conducting a separate trial or review of the
arbitration proceedings. Thus, it may be that enforcement of religious
arbitration agreements is an impermissible delegation of the government's
power to enforce of the civil law.
D. Practical Implications ofNonenforcement
This Part has argued that the judicial enforcement of religious
arbitration agreements may be an impermissible delegation under the
Establishment Clause. It is worth noting that this argument for the
nonenforcement of religious arbitration agreements is consistent with the
continued employment of a number of related alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms. First, persons who are motivated by their religious beliefs to
avoid litigating their disputes in civil court may continue to employ secular
arbitration agreements in their contractual relationships. Additionally,
religious persons and groups may continue to employ nonbinding religious
arbitration or mediation to reach mutually acceptable settlements of legal
disputes. Parties may use contractual agreements to specify which specific
religious authority or tribunal will be relied upon to resolve disputes regarding
questions of religious doctrine.95 And religious institutions could still provide
nonbinding religious mediation services. This mediation, if successful, could
prompt the parties to agree to a binding settlement agreement, which would
resolve their legal dispute. But crucially, in the context of nonbinding
mediation, both parties must voluntarily agree to a settlement at the time of
" See McCarthy v. Fuller, 714 F.3d 971, 975-76 (7th Cir. 2013) (noting that the
religious question doctrine is difficult to apply in cases where there is no clear religious
hierarchy, such as congregational churches, and so courts may be required to find some
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mediation, after the dispute has arisen-not in advance of any dispute as with
a binding arbitration agreement.
Finally, the nondelegation argument presented here would not prevent
courts from requiring the specific performance of Jewish husbands who have
agreed to resolve marital disputes through a beth din or Rabbinical Court.9 6
While a civil court would retain the authority to determine the terms of the
divorce, such as spousal support, division of marital assets, and child custody,
the court could compel the husband to go before a beth din, which in turn could
convince him to sign a get.97 Ordering specific performance in such cases is
not a delegation of governmental powers, since the government does not have
the authority to issue religious divorces. Rather, the religious arbitration
agreement would be treated as a contract to perform a certain action-namely,
agree to a religious divorce in the event of a civil divorce-rather than a
provision providing for alternative dispute resolution with respect to the terms
of the divorce itself.
V. RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION AND THE RELIGIOUS QUESTION
DOCTRINE
Part III argued that judicial enforcement of religious arbitration
agreements could run afoul of the Establishment Clause nondelegation
doctrine. When courts have addressed the Establishment Clause in cases
involving religious arbitration agreements, however, they often refer to the
religious question doctrine, arguing that because they can enforce a religious
arbitration agreement without deciding any questions about religious doctrine,
they should do so.98 But there is a strong argument that courts have misapplied
the religious question doctrine to religious arbitration agreements. Instead of
ceding decisionmaking authority to religious arbitrators, courts should seek to
resolve the underlying civil law dispute between the parties. So understood,
the religious question doctrine supports, rather than conflicts with, the result
that enforcement of religious arbitration agreements may violate the
Establishment Clause.
96 See Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136 (N.Y. 1983).
* See Greenawalt, supra note 17 (discussing concerns about religious freedom arising
from courts ordering specific performance in such cases).
" See Encore Productions, Inc. v. Promise Keepers, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1112 (D.
Colo. 1999) ("A court can, and should, apply neutral principles of law to determine
disputed questions that do not implicate religious doctrine" (citing Jones v. Wolf, '43 U.S
595 (1979).).
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A. The Argument in Favor ofEnforcement
The religious question doctrine states that courts may not resolve
questions or controversies about religious doctrine.99 Instead, civil courts
should typically defer to the highest religious authority for a resolution, at least
where the religious institution is organized hierarchically."oo The religious
question doctrine typically applies where courts are faced with a legal dispute
(such as a dispute involving employment or church property) between two
members of a religion or representatives of a religious institution, where their
legal dispute depends in some way on a question about religious doctrine, such
as who may rightly claim to be an ordained religious leader. For example, in
Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, a bishop who had been formally
defrocked by his Mother Church argued that he retained control of church
assets on the grounds that the defrocking procedure was flawed. 10' The
Supreme Court denied the bishop's claim on the grounds that the defrocking
procedure was a matter of "internal discipline and government" within a
"hierarchical religious organization," and the First Amendment requires courts
to accept as binding "the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal within
a church of hierarchical polity" with respect o "religious issues of doctrine or
polity."l0 2
On the other hand, the religious question doctrine allows courts to
decide legal disputes if they can do so solely by reference to "neutral principles
of law," that is, principles that do not depend on resolving questions about
religious doctrine.103 In Jones v. Wolf for example, the Court decided a
9 See Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'1
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969) (holding that courts may not decide
controversies about religious doctrine).
100 See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 710 (1976)
(holding that the First Amendment prohibits civil courts from resolving church property
disputes on the basis of religious doctrine and practice); See also Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas
Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952) (holding that Supreme Church Authority of the Russian
Orthodox Church in Moscow had authority to appoint the archbishop who controlled
church property in the U.S. over objections from North American churches that the
Supreme Authority was under the influence of the Soviet government).
i'0 Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 707.
1021d at 709, 723 (citing Md. & Va. Churches v. Sharpsburg Church, 396 U. S. 367,
369 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
103 See Presbyterian Church in U.S., 393 U.S. at 449 ("[T]here are neutral principles
of law, developed for use in all property disputes, which can be applied without
'establishing' churches to which property is awarded."); Cf Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off
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property dispute between rival factions of a Presbyterian congregation in
Georgia, by taking into account deeds and state statutes governing church
property, as well as the local church's charter and the general church's
constitution. 104 Although the schism was caused by disagreement about
religious matters-namely, whether to separate from the U.S. branch of the
Presbyterian Church-the Court held that it did not need to resolve this
religious issue in order to resolve the property dispute.os Furthermore, the
Court suggested that it is beneficial for courts to resolve legal disputes among
coreligionists by reference to "neutral principles of law" rather than deferring
to the decisions of religious authorities.106 Deciding legal disputes on the basis
of neutral principles of law allows courts to better reflect the interests and
desires of church members, by allowing them to effectively opt-out of
religious hierarchies by means of legal instruments such as trusts and deeds.0 7
Moreover, a neutral principles analysis can allow courts to avoid the often-
vexed question of what body actually is the "highest ecclesiastical tribunal"
within a religious organization.08
Following Jones, some courts have interpreted the neutral principles
of law approach to create a requirement that courts resolve civil disputes
between coreligionists on the basis of neutral principles whenever possible-
including by means of enforcing religious arbitration agreements.'09 Enforcing
Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts over Religious Property, 98 CoLUM. L. REv. 1843,
1844 (1998) (describing the religious question doctrine, also known as the "hands-off"
approach, as requiring civil courts to "choose between deferring to judgments made by a
group's hierarchy or using neutral principles of law," to decide the case, such as
"documents that do not require controversial interpretations of doctrines or practices").
1" See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
105 Id. at 597-98.
106 Id. at 604 ("[T]he promise of nonentanglement and neutrality inherent in the
neutral-principles approach more than compensates for what will be occasional problems
in application,").
107 Id. at 603 ("[T]he neutral-principles analysis shares the peculiar genius of private-
law systems in general [namely] flexibility in ordering private rights and obligations to
reflect the intentions of the parties.").
108 Cf Jones, 443 U.S. at 605. See also Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria 442 F.3d
1036, 1039 (7th Cir. 2006); McCarthy v. Fuller 714 F.3d 971, 975-76 (7th Cir. 2013)
(noting that the religious question doctrine is difficult to apply in cases where there is no
clear religious hierarchy, such as congregational churches, and so courts may be, required
to find some "neutral principle" on which to base their legal decision, rather than attempt
to decide a religious question).
'n Cf Encore Productions, Inc. v. Promise Keepers, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1112-13
(D. Colo. 1999) (granting a motion to compel religious arbitration on the grounds that that
a "court can, and should, apply neutral principles of law to determine disputed questions
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a religious arbitration agreement requires courts to apply only the FAA (or
similar state statue) and basic contract law doctrine, not to answer questions
of religious doctrine. For example, in Meshel v. Ohev Sholom Talmud Torah,
the D.C. Circuit reasoned that by enforcing the parties' arbitration agreement,
the court avoided the need to decide the parties' underlying dispute regarding
the interpretation of religious terms such as "Din Torah" and "Orthodox."1 o
Moreover, religious arbitration agreements, much like trusts and deeds, allow
parties autonomy over their legal relationship, such as what religious rules or
doctrine will govern their relationship and what religious authority will resolve
any dispute between them."' Thus the religious question doctrine, and the
neutral principles of law approach found in Jones v. Wolf may seem to support
enforcement of religious arbitration agreements.
B. Evaluating the Argument
But it is not clear that the religious question doctrine, and the neutral
principles of law approach, is best understood to create a presumption in favor
of enforcement of religious arbitration agreements. On the contrary, the
purpose of allowing courts to decide civil disputes on the basis of neutral
principles of law was to avoid the need for courts to defer to the judgments of
religious authorities."2 While it is true that enforcing religious arbitration
agreements may have benefits for courts and for the parties, the primary effect
of enforcement is that a religious arbitrator will decide a legal dispute that
perhaps could have been decided by a civil court. This effect flies in the face
of the reasoning in Jones v. Wolf where the Court appealed to neutral
principles of law in order to provide courts with more, rather than less,
opportunity to decide legal disputes between coreligionists. As an alternative,
courts should look to the underlying civil law dispute to determine whether it
that do not implicate religious doctrine" (citing Jones v. Wolf 443 U.S. 595 (1979)).).
no Meshel v. Ohev Sholom Talmud Torah, 869 A.2d 343, 354 (D.C. 2005). For a
contrary opinion, see Sieger v. Sieger, 297 A.D.2d 33 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (finding that
interpreting a contractual provision that required the parties to resolve their disputes "in
accordance with the regulations of Speyer, Worms, and Mainz" would require the court to
make a determination regarding religious doctrine and was therefore prohibited under the
Establishment Clause).
". Absent such a prior agreement, courts must determine who is the relevant religious
authority, which might often itself be a matter of controversy. See Jones v. Wolf 443 U.S.
595 (1979)).
"1 See Jones, 443 U.S. at 603-04.
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can be resolved by appeal to neutral principles, and only defer to the specified
religious arbitration tribunal when it cannot.
As an illustration of this approach, consider Spivey v. Teen Challenge,
a case in which a mother filed a wrongful death suit against a Christian drug
rehabilitation facility, alleging that the facility negligently released her son
from its care shortly before he died of multiple drug toxicity.113 Because the
son had signed an arbitration clause upon first entering the facility, the court
dismissed the mother's wrongful death suit on the grounds that, as
representative of the son's estate, the arbitration agreement was binding upon
her. But here it seems likely that the validity of the mother's wrongful death
claim does not depend on answering any religious questions. The facility had
released the decedent son because he ingested cough syrup in violation of the
facility's rules.114 But the court likely could have determined whether the
facility was negligent by reference to neutral principles of tort law, without
deciding any religious questions such as whether, in violating the facility's
rules, the son failed to perform his religious obligation. Even if drinking the
cough syrup were a violation of the son's religious obligation, the facility
would not have been absolved of its legal duty of care. Nor, for that matter,
must the mother show that the facility failed to perform its religious
obligations-the question is entirely a legal one. As such, in cases where
adjudicating the underlying legal claim does not depend on resolving a
question of religious doctrine, there is no reason for courts to aggressively
interpret the religious question doctrine to require enforcement of religious
arbitration agreements. Consistent with this argument, parties may continue to
utilize religious arbitration agreements to specify which religious authority
would be appointed to decide a "religious question"-i.e., a question of
religious doctrine rather than a question of civil or private law. Thus, parties
could agree in advance to submit their disputes regarding questions of
religious doctrine to a religious body or authority, allowing courts to avoid
answering the complicated question of which authority is highest in a given
case.
C. Hosanna-Tabor and Church Autonomy
The interpretation of the religious question doctrine described in
Section B appears to be at odds with the Supreme Court's decision in
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Hosanna-Tabor v. E.E.O.C. 11 Hosanna-Tabor involved an employment
discrimination claim, this time brought by a teacher at an Evangelical Lutheran
elementary school, who was fired after she developed narcolepsy. The Court
held, under the "ministerial exception," that religious institutions are protected
from employment discrimination laws when hiring or firing "ministers," i.e.
those whose employment involves the performance of religious duties.116
Some scholars have argued that Hosanna-Tabor should be read to
endorse a broad view of deference to religious institutions, according to which
religious institutions ought to have a "sovereign" authority over their own
internal affairs and the affairs of their members."'7 In this respect, Hosanna-
Tabor might reflect an emerging thread of Establishment Clause doctrine,
sometimes labeled the "church autonomy doctrine."iis According to church
autonomy doctrine, courts should grant religious institutions broad leeway to
oversee their internal affairs, including matters that are typically regulated by
the state, such as employment and the provision of social services such as
education and healthcare. And, as some scholars have argued, religious
arbitration agreements may provide an additional way to insulate various
"'Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC., 565 U.S. 171
(2012) (holding, under both Religion Clauses, that the ministerial exception barred
teacher's employment discrimination claim brought under the Americans with Disabilities
Act).
"6 The term "minister" carried a lot of weight in the decision and its proper meaning
in this context remains up for debate. Cf Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 197 (Thomas J.,
concurring) (arguing that civil courts must "to defer to a religious organization's good-faith
understanding of who qualifies as its minister" rather than make that determination
themselves). The ministerial exception is often thought o be a component, along with the
religious question doctrine, of a broader "hands-off" approach that courts should adopt
when dealing with religious institutions. Cf Greenawalt, supra note 17.
' See Michael A. Helfand, Religion's Footnote Four: Church Autonomy as
Arbitration, 97 MNN. L. REv. 1891 (2013) (arguing that in order to reconcile Hosanna-
Tabor with the Court's prior Free Exercise doctrine, the decision should be read as
"lay[ing] the groundwork for conceptualizing church autonomy as a constitutionalized
version of [religious] arbitration"); Paul Horwitz, Act III of the Ministerial Exception, 106
Nw. U. L. REV. 973-93 (2012).
"' See Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The
Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV.
1373 (1981); See also Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter? Towards an Institutional
Understanding of the Religion Clauses, 53 VIL. L. REV. 273 (2008); Paul Horwitz,
Churches as First Amendment Institutions: Of Sovereignty and Spheres, 44 HARV. CIV.
RTS.-Crv. LIBERTIES L. REV. 79 (2009); Michael A. Helfand, Litigating Religion, 93 B.U.
L. Rev. 493 (2013) (arguing that courts should return to an approach of institutional
deference rather than adopt the religious question doctrine).
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aspects of religious institutions from the scrutiny of civil courts, subject to the
consent of both parties to the agreement.119 As such, the church autonomy
doctrine may be interpreted to lend constitutional support to the enforceability
of religious arbitration agreements.1 20
But the church autonomy doctrine does not provide a stand-alone
argument in favor of enforcing religious arbitration agreements. It is true that
any additional autonomy secured by religious institutions as a result of
religious arbitration agreements will be a function of the choices of individuals
to sign the agreements. But it is not clear that the extent of constitutionally
permissible authority that a religious institution may exercise over its members
or others should be determined by private choices. Determining the correct
constitutional balance between church autonomy and the rights and interests
of the church's members is a question for courts to answer, not for parties to
stipulate in advance.121
In sum, this Part of the Article argued that the neutral principles of law
approach employed in Jones v. Wolf could be interpreted to support the
nonenforcement of religious arbitration agreements, rather than their
enforcement. Courts should seek to decide legal disputes wherever possible,
rather than deferring to religious authorities, including religious arbitrators. In
keeping with the spirit of Jones v. Wolf, the religious question doctrine should
be interpreted to require nonenforcement of religious arbitration agreements.
As such, the religious question doctrine need not conflict with the
nondelegation doctrine analysis described in Part III.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article presented an argument that judicial enforcement of
religious arbitration agreements may violate the Establishment Clause.
According to the Establishment Clause's nondelegation doctrine, the
government may not delegate its important or core functions to religious
institutions where that results in a "fusion" of governmental and religious
functions-i.e., where the religious institution has an opportunity to carry out
119 See generally Helfand, supra note 5.
120
121 This balance may be responsive to, among other things, the members' freedom of
association rights, private rights, and perhaps the freedoms of the institutions themselves.
See Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000) (holding that freedom of
association allowed the Boy Scouts to fire a scout leader for being gay). For a discussion
of this case and the scope and purpose of freedom of association, see generally Seana
Valentine Shiffrin, Essay: What Is Really Wrong With Compelled Association, 99 Nw. U.
L. REv. 839 (2004).
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a governmental function according to its religious doctrines or principles. This
Article argued that enforcement of religious arbitration agreements may result
in such an impermissible fusion, especially in cases in which the arbitrator acts
with a predominately religious purpose. Enforcement of religious arbitration
agreements may be consistent with the Establishment Clause, but only where
the court determines that the underlying legal dispute turns on a question of
religious doctrine. Finally, even if the constitution prohibits (or limits) the
enforceability of religious arbitration agreements, there are a range of
alternative dispute mechanisms that may still be available to religious persons
and institutions, including non-binding mediation services and secular
arbitration.
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